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Clardy: Nonresident Defendants Don't Deserve Convenience or Justice in So

NONRESIDENT DEFENDANTS
DON'T DESERVE CONVENIENCE
OR JUSTICE IN SOUTH CAROLINA?
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a South Carolina court acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant
based solely on the state's long-arm statute, the defendant cannot change venue for
2
the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice.' The following hypothetical
demonstrates how South Carolina's long-arm statute unfairly denies nonresident
defendants the same opportunity to change venue that resident defendants have to
avoid gross inconvenience and injustice.
Bill Jones, a resident of Augusta, Georgia, was driving through Aiken County,
South Carolina, on Interstate 20 when he collided with another car. He struck the
rear end of a vehicle driven by Alan Paul. Paul's wife, Ellen, was sitting in the
passenger seat at the time of the accident. As a result of the accident, Ellen Paul
suffered numerous injuries, including permanent disfigurement, and was unable to
work for several months.
Subsequently, Ellen filed a complaint, naming both Bill Jones and her husband,
Alan Paul, as defendants. The Pauls were residents of Aiken County. By joining
her husband as a defendant, Ellen effectively destroyed Jones's opportunity to
remove the case on diversity grounds. Rather than filing the complaint in Aiken
County, the county where she resides and the county where the accident occurred,
Ellen brought the suit in Allendale County pursuant to South Carolina Code section
15-7-30. 3 Similar to many South Carolina plaintiffs, Ellen filed suit in Allendale
to take advantage of the generous juries for which that county is famous."
Jones filed a motion to transfer venue to Aiken County for the convenience of
witnesses and the ends of justice pursuant to South Carolina Code section 15-7100(3).5 In support of his motion to transfer venue, Jones introduced affidavits from
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(2) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
2. This hypothetical is based loosely on a motion to transfer venue that I observed during the
summer of 2003.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (Law. Co-op. 1977) provides that an action against a nonresident
defendant "may be tried in any county which the plaintiff shall designate in his complaint."
4. See JackpotJurisdiction?(WJBF News CHANNEL 6 television broadcast, Aug. 19, 2002).
Hampton Countyis also well known in South Carolina for munificentjuries. JackpotJurisdiction?Part
III(WJBF News CHANNEL 6 television broadcast, Aug. 21,2002) ("Jury verdicts in Hampton County
are three or four times higher than other similar sized counties in the state. Some call them 'plaintiff
friendly."').
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-100(3) (Law. Co-op. 1977) ("The court may change the place of trial
in the following cases: ... (3) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends ofjustice would be
promoted by the change.").
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each of the four doctors who treated Ellen's injuries, all residents of Aiken County,
stating that it would be more convenient for them to appear for trial in Aiken
County. These affidavits noted that the distance from the medical providers' places
of business to the Aiken County courthouse was much shorter than the distance to
the Allendale County courthouse. Jones also offered an affidavit from the highway
patrolman who investigated the accident stating that Aiken County was more
convenient for him because the patrolman was a resident of Aiken County. Jones
further noted to the Allendale court that none of the parties to the case had a
connection to Allendale County: he was a resident of Augusta, Georgia; the
plaintiff, Ellen, was a resident of Aiken; the other defendant, Ellen's husband, was
a resident of Aiken; and the accident occurred in Aiken. In addition, all the eyewitnesses to the accident were residents of Aiken. Thus, all the witnesses to the
case resided in or near Aiken, and no witness was connected to Allendale.
Ellen offered no affidavits or other evidence to rebut Jones's proof that
transferring the case to Aiken County would promote the convenience of witnesses
and the ends of justice. Instead, Ellen argued that because the Allendale court
obtained personal jurisdiction over Defendant Jones pursuant to South Carolina's
long-arm statute, section 36-2-803,6 the action against Jones could not be
transferred to another venue for the convenience of witnesses and the ends of
justice. Specifically, section 36-2-803(2) provides that "[w]hen jurisdiction over a
person is based solely upon this section ...such action, if brought in this State,
shall not be subject to the provisions of section 15-7-100(3)." 7 Despite the
overwhelming evidence presented by Jones supporting his motion to transfer venue,
the judge denied the motion simply on the basis of section 36-2-803(2).
Plaintiff lawyers in Allendale and Hampton Counties often use section 36-2803(2) in their attempts to quash transfer of venue motions.8 The inequities of this
provision in the long-arm statute are clear, especially in a situation like that
described above. South Carolina plaintiffs often file their claims in Allendale or
Hampton County for the sole purpose of obtaining a large jury verdict." Despite the
inconvenience the proceedings in these counties might pose, a nonresident
defendant has no recourse to transfer venue. The nonresident defendant is stuck in
whatever county the plaintiff chooses.
To fully illustrate South Carolina's novel, unfair approach to long-arm
jurisdiction, Part II of this Comment discusses the rationale behind long-arm
jurisdiction generally and describes the historyof South Carolina's long-arm statute.
Part III argues that section 36-2-803(2) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the

6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1) (Law. Co-op. 1977) ("A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's
...
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this State.").
7. Id. § 36-2-803(2).
8. I must credit an insurance defense lawyer, practicing in Columbia, South Carolina, for this
statement.
9. See JackpotJurisdiction?(WJBF News CHANNEL 6 television broadcast, Aug. 19, 2002).
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Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is not rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose. Part IV demonstrates that this section also
violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution because it denies nonresident defendants equal access to the
courts of South Carolina to defend actions brought against them. Finally, Part V
discusses potential arguments that nonresident defendants can make to avoid the
section 36-2-803(2) prohibition against transfer of venue. Nonresident defendants
can argue that the long-arm statute was not the sole basis of jurisdiction, and
therefore, that section 36-2-803(2) should not apply to bar change of venue for the
convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice.
II. HISTORY
A.

The HistoricalRole ofLong-Arm Jurisdiction

The judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 Most courts in the 19th century followed
the rule from Pennoyer v. Nef]" that a court "could not exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident who had not been personally served with process in
the forum."'" In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, courts began to relax the
strict limits on state jurisdiction over nonresidents, adapting to changes in
technology, transportation, and communication.' 3 For example, the United States
Supreme Court upheld state statutes that required nonresident corporations to
appoint an in-state agent to receive service of process as a condition of transacting
business within the state' 4 and statutes providing in-state substituted service for
nonresident motorists who caused injury in the state. 5
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington 6 set aside the Due Process requirement that service be made within the
territorial limits of the jurisdiction in suits arising out of the nonresident defendant's
activities in the state. 17 InternationalShoe established the "minimum contacts"
standard to determine ifassertingpersonaljurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
comports with "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. '
Subsequent to InternationalShoe, states passed long-arm statutes to extend the
personal jurisdiction of their courts over nonresident individuals and corporations

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (dictum).
Id.
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 616 (1990).
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882).
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at316.
Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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who could not be found and served in their fora. 19
Long-arm statutes provide only for specific jurisdiction over nonresident

defendants. Specific jurisdiction is limited to causes of action arising from the
nonresident defendant's activities with the forum state.2" Specific jurisdiction is,
therefore, much more limited than general jurisdiction,2 under which a court
acquires in personamjurisdiction over a defendant in any suit, whether or not the
suit arises from the defendant's activities within the forum.22 Such broad
jurisdiction over a defendant through general jurisdiction requires a showing of
more substantial contacts with the forum state.2" Different from the minimum
contacts standard to acquire specific jurisdiction pursuant to a state's long-arm
statute, a defendant's activities within the forum must be sufficiently continuous and
systematic to submit the defendant to the general jurisdiction of the state's courts.24
Ultimately, plaintiffs depend on their state's long-arm statutes to acquire personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who have limited contacts with their states
for causes of action that arise from those limited contacts.25
B.

The History of South Carolina'sLong-Arm Statute

South Carolina adopted its long-arm statute, oddly, as a floor amendment to the
enactment of South Carolina's version of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1966.26
South Carolina state Senator James P. Mozingo III proposed the amendment to add

19. JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 81 (8th ed., West Group 2001) (1968) ("The first
truly comprehensive long-arm statute was enacted in Illinois and it was used as a model by a number
of states. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the statute was an attempt to assert jurisdiction to
the fullest permissible constitutional limits.").
20. See Sheppard v. Jacksonville Marine Supply, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D.S.C. 1995)
(citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)).
21. However, in another sense, specific jurisdiction is more useful to some plaintiffs in the postInternationalShoe era because general jurisdiction, with a heightened minimum contacts requirement,
is frequently unavailable except in the defendant's state of domicile. See infra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
22. See Sheppard, 877 F. Supp. at 264 (citing Helicopteros,466 U.S. at 414 n.9).
23. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,447 (1952) (considering whether
"the business done in Ohio by the respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and of such
a nature topermit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the cause of
action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio").
24. See id. at 445-46 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16.
25. The majority in Helicopteros left open the question of whether there is a "meaningful distinction... between a cause of action that 'arises out of' a nonresident defendant's activity within the
forum state and one that is merely 'related to' a defendant's forum state activities." Howard B. Stravitz,
Sayonarato Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REv. 729,773
n.213 (1988). "The majority acknowledged the possibility of ajurisdictionally meaningful distinction
between 'arising out of' and 'related to,' but declined to express any view on the matter because the
parties did not argue the point." Id. at 724 n.213 (citing Helicopteros 466 U.S. at 415 n.10).
26. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, S. 96, 2d Sess., at 917-22 (S.C. 1966).
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the long-arm statute. 27 Mozingo was clearly an advocate of plaintiffs; he served as
president of the American Trial Lawyers Association" and likely added the

prohibition against changing venue into the long-arm statute to benefit South
Carolina plaintiffs.
"Entitled 'Further Remedies,' 29 [the long-arm statute's] provisions appear as
an eighth part of the sales article-a part not found in the Uniform Commercial
statute31
a
Code's official version." In fact, no other state has enacted its long-arm
as part of its Uniform Commercial Code.
South Carolina's long-arm statute defines "person" to include an individual,
"whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this State," and a corporation, "whether
or not organized under the laws of this State., 32 This provision grants South
Carolina courts personal jurisdiction under the following circumstances:
Personal jurisdiction based upon conduct.
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who
acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising
from the person's

(a) transacting any business in this State;

27. Id.
28. SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 30 (Clerk, House of Representatives ed., 1966).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-801 to 36-2-809 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
30. Robert F. Folks, Comment, South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code-The Demise of
Its Long Arm Provisions,24 S.C. L. REV. 474, 474 (1972).
31. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a)(2)(A)-(I) (Supp. 2002); ALASKASTAT. § 09.05.015 (Michie 2002);
ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a) (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (B) (Michie 1999); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 410.10 (West 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b
(West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West Supp. 2003);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (Supp. 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634-3 5 (Michie 2002); IDAHO CODE
§ 5-514 (Michie 1998); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209(a) (West 2003); IND. R. TRIAL P. 4.4(A)
(2003); IOWACODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b) (Supp. 2002); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(a) (Michie Supp. 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3201 (West 1999); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103 (2002);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.705, 600.715
(West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (2002); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 506.500 (West 2003); MONT. R. CIV. P. 4B (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1995); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 14.065 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:4 (1997); N.J. R. SUPER. TAX
SURR. CTS. 4:4-4(b)(1); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (Michie 1998); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney
2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2001); N.D. R. CIv. P. 4(b)(2)(A)-(I); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.382 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004(F) (West Supp. 2003); OR. R. CIv. P.
4(B)-(L) (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West Supp. 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33
(1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-2 (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214 (1994); TEX. CIV.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.041-17.069 (Vernon 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (2002); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 913(b) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie Supp. 2003); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-33 (Michie Supp. 2003); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 801.05(2)-(11) (West Supp. 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-107 (Michie 2003).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-801 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
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(b) contracting to supply services or things in this State;
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this
State;
(d) causing tortious injury or death in this State by an act or
omission outside this State if he regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in this State; or
(e) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property
in this State; or
(f) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this State at the time of contracting; or
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part
by either party in this State; or
(h) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with
the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be
used or consumed in this State and are so used or
consumned.
(2) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this
section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated
in this section may be asserted against him, and such action,
ifbrought in this State, shallnot be subject to the provisions
of§ 15-7-100(3)."
Much of the above language follows verbatim that of the Uniform Interstate
Procedure Act.34 However, even though South Carolina's long-ann statute, as

enacted, effectively broadened the scope of its courts' inpersonan jurisdiction, the
statute drew criticism and opposition on state constitutional grounds because it was
passed as an amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code. 5 Although the state's

33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (emphasis added).
34. Folks, supra note 30, at 475 (citing UNIFORM INTERSTATE PROCEDURE ACT § 1.3).
35. Joseph Halstead McGee, Jr., a member of the South Carolina House of Representatives, voted

against concurrence to the Senate amendment that added the long-arm statute, stating it was not
germane to the bill. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H. 96, 2d Sess., at 1566 (S.C.
1966). He argued that this section dealt with thejurisdiction of the courts and is "major legislation" that
"should be considered on its own merits." Id.
McGee's argument was later validated in a series of cases decided after the statute was originally
enacted. See, e.g., McGee v.Holan Div. of Ohio Brass Co., 337 F. Supp. 72, 75 (D.S.C. 1972); Tention
v. S. Pac. R.R., 336 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D.S.C. 1972). The courts in these cases sustained challenges to
the act on grounds that it violated Article 1Il, Section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution, which
specifies that "[e]very Act or joint resolation having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and
that shall be expressed in the title." See McGee, 337 F. Supp. at 76; Tention, 336 F. Supp. at 28.
The title of South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code made no mention of tort claims for
personal injuries that were totally unrelated to commercial transactions. 1966 S.C. Acts 1065. The
District Court for the District of South Carolina held that the title did not sufficiently reflect the

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/5

6

Deserve Convenience or Justice in So
PROCEDURE
CIVI, Don't
2004]Clardy: Nonresident Defendants

highest court has found the long-arm statute to be fully effective, it remains
questionable why the General Assembly persists on burying the state's long-arm
provisions within the Uniform Commercial Code rather than simply transferring the
reenacted long-arm statute to thejurisdictional or procedural provisions of the Code.
No other state in the nation has enacted its long-arm statute within its Uniform
Commercial Code. 6 Why must South Carolina be different?
The location of the long-arm statute within the Code, however, is merely one
of the oddities regarding South Carolina's long-arm statute. The most significant
difference between South Carolina's long-am statute and the long-arm statutes of
every other state is that section 36-2-803(2) prohibits a nonresident defendant,
brought under the court's jurisdiction pursuant to the long-ann statute, from
transferring venue under section 15-7-100(3) 3" for the convenience of witnesses and
the ends ofjustice. No other state's long-arm statute limits the defendant's right to
transfer venue.38 Section 36-2-803(2) is subject to constitutional challenges because
it limits a defendant's right to change venue whenjurisdiction is based on the longarm statute, unlike any other state. An appellate court has yet to rule on the

constitutionality of section 36-2-803(2). However, state trial judges have heard the
constitutional arguments and dismissed them without consideration. It is imperative
that a higher court resolve the issue.
III. SECTION

36-2-803(2) VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids a state to

noncommercial long-arm provisions of South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code so as to meet the
requirements of Article III, Section 17. See McGee, 337 F. Supp. at 76; Tention, 336 F. Supp. at 28.
United States District Court Judge Robert F. Chapman stated: "With such a voluminous act it is
doubtful if all of the members of the General Assembly realized that it contained provisions unrelated
to commercial transactions." McGee, 337 F. Supp. at 76. Judge Chapman found that section 36-2803(l)(c) and (d) dealt with tortious activity unrelated to commercial transactions-the subject of the
act. Id. at 75. Thus, these sections were held to be unconstitutional. Id. at 76. The court also observed
that no notice was given by the title to the act that it contained long-arm provisions for causes of action
completely divorced from commercial transactions. Id. at 75. Judge Chapman referred to two decisions
by South Carolina state trial judges in which each court held that section 36-2-803(c) and (e) violated
the requirements of Article Ill, Section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution. Id. (citations omitted).
The rulings of unconstitutionality in the cases above prompted the General Assembly in 1972 to
reenact the long-arm provisions under a new title to include long-arm jurisdiction over causes of action
that are not related to commercial transactions. 1972 S.C. Acts 1343. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina held Act No. 1343 of 1972 to be a "complete remedial statute of substantial benefit. Its
homogeneous terms relate to but one subject which is expressed in its title in more detail than is
required." Thompson v. Hofmann, 263 S.C. 314, 319, 210 S.E.2d 461,463 (1974).
36. See supranote 31.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-100(3) (Law. Co-op. 1977) ("The court may change the place of trial
in the following cases: ... (3) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be
promoted by the change.").
38. See supra note 31.
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"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."39
Because section 36-2-803(2) does not deprive nonresident defendants "of a
fundamental right nor classify along suspect lines like race or religion, [this
provision does] not deny equal protection to [nonresident defendants] unless [it]
fail[s] in rationally furthering legitimate state ends. 40
Section 36-2-803(2) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it denies nonresident defendants the same due process of law
applied to residents. Nonresident defendants cannot move to transfer venue on the
basis of convenience of witnesses or ends ofjustice when the court has inpersonam
jurisdiction over them pursuant to the long-arm statute. 41 However, when the court
acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant by virtue of his or her residency in
South Carolina, the resident defendant is permitted to move for transfer of venue on
the basis of convenience and justice.42
The discriminatory treatment of resident and nonresident defendants in section
36-2-803(2) is similar to that found in a venue statute struck down by the Supreme
Court of South Carolina in Windham v. Pace.43 The statute at issue in Windham
provided that an action against a resident motor carrier may be brought only in a
county through which it operatesbut an action against a nonresidentmotor carrier
may be brought in any county of the state." The court found no real distinction
between domestic and foreign motor carriers operating under the statute; both
45
engage in the same form of business and make similar use of the state's highways.
Therefore, the court found this classification to be "clearly arbitrary" and "not based
on a real and substantial difference having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation." The state supreme court ultimately struck down the venue
provisions of this statute because it "manifestly denies the equal protection of the
law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.""7
The Windham court cited the United States Supreme Court decision in Power
Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders48 as authority for its ruling.49 In Saunders, the
Supreme Court held that an Arkansas statute unconstitutionally deprived foreign
corporations of equal protection of the law by permitting them to be sued in any
county in the state, while actions against domestic corporations could only be
brought in counties where they are found, do business, or have a representative. 50

39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(2) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-100(3) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
43. 192 S.C. 271, 6 S.E.2d 270 (1939).

44. Id. at 276, 6 S.E.2d at 272.
45. Id. at 277, 6 S.E.2d at 273.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.

Id.
274 U.S. 490 (1927).
Windham, 192 S.C. at 277-78, 6 S.E.2d at 272-73.
Saunders, 274 U.S. at 491-92, 497.
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The Court concluded "that the special classification and discriminatory treatment
of foreign corporations are without reasonable basis and essentially arbitrary.'
Although South Carolina courts have not questioned Windham, in Burlington
RailroadCo. v. Ford,52 the United States Supreme Court severely limited Saunders.
In Burlington,the Court upheld a Montana statute that permitted "a plaintiff to sue
a corporation incorporated in that State only in the county of its principal place of
business, but permit[ted] suit in any county against a corporation incorporated
elsewhere." 53 The Court applied rational basis review to find that the Montana
54
statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Saunders was distinguished
on the ground that the Arkansas statute was too overinclusive because it applied
only to foreign corporations authorized to do business in Arkansas such that most
of the corporations subject to its "any-county rule" probably had a place of business
in Arkansas. 55 The Court found that "most of the corporations subject to Montana's
any-county rule probably [did] not have their principal place of business in
Montana."56 Thus, while limiting Saunders, the Supreme Court maintained that
Saunders is still good law.5
The Arkansas statute in Saunderswas struck down because it was overly broad,
and the Montana statute was upheld in Burlington because it was more narrowly
focused. Like the statute at issue in Saunders,the overinclusiveness of section 362-803(2) is so great that it does not rationally implement South Carolina's purpose.
Section 36-2-803(2) restricts all defendants brought under the court's jurisdiction
pursuant to the long-arm statute from transferring venue. Although South
Carolina's long-arm statute is most likely to be applied only to nonresidents doing
business in the state and not having a place of business in South Carolina, similar
to the Montana statute at issue in Burlington, section 36-2-803(2) is not narrowly
tailored to meet that end. The provision does not differentiate between corporations
or individuals, between defendants that may be difficult to serve and those that can
be served with relative ease, between defendants that consent to jurisdiction and
those that contest jurisdiction, or between defendants who have a great interest in
convenience and those that will be similarly inconvenienced no matter where the
suit is tried. The Burlington court emphasized that "most of the corporations
subject to Montana's any-county rule probably do not have their principal place of
business in Montana. 5 8 Thus, the convenience to these corporations of litigating
in a particular county was not important. While Burlington distinguishes the
Montana and Arkansas statutes, the real difference is not apparent. It is apparent,

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at494.
504 U.S. 648 (1992).
Id. at 649.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 654 (1992).
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however, that section 36-2-803(2) is not focused narrowly enough to meet the
Burlington standard. Most significantly, section 36-2-803(2) overlooks, indeed
prohibits, an analysis of the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice for all
nonresidents brought within the court'sjurisdiction pursuant to the long-arm statute.
In addition, the Burlington court made it "clear that a State might temper...
an 'any county' rule to the extent a reasonable assessment of defendants' interests
so justified."59 One may conclude that South Carolina has determined that
nonresident defendants have no interest to justify tempering its any-county rule.
Thus, the disparate treatment of nonresidents and residents under section 36-2803(2) is a far greater denial of equal protection of the law because this provision
prohibits a nonresident from transferring venue for the convenience of witnesses
and the ends of justice, even in the most egregious cases like the hypothetical
presented at the beginning of this Comment. It is constitutional for South Carolina
to subject nonresident defendants to venue in any county: Burlington made this
clear. However, once venue is properly laid pursuant to an any-county rule, a state
cannot subsequently prohibit a nonresident defendant from changing venue when
a resident defendant in the same case would have such a right. It must be noted that
while the Montana statute was upheld, Montana tempers its any-county rule with
a statutory provision allowing the courts to change venue for the convenience of
witnesses and the ends ofjustice: "The court or judge must, on motion, change the
place of trial in the following cases: ...(3) when the convenience of witnesses and

the ends of justice would be promoted by the change." 60 South Carolina prohibits
this exact type of transfer, leaving a nonresident defendant no relief from its anycounty venue rules.
In American Service Corp. of S.C. v. Hickle,6 ' the Supreme Court of South
Carolina made clear that "[i]n determining whether a statute violates the equal
protection clauses of state and federal constitutions, [it] must give great deference
to the classification passed by the legislature, and the classification will be sustained
against constitutional attack if it is not plainly arbitrary and there is 'any reasonable
hypothesis' to support it."62 The Hickle court identified a three-prong test,
established in Samson v. Greenville Hospital System, 63 to determine if a statute
satisfies equal protection:
(1) [T]he classification bears a reasonable relation to the
legislative purpose sought to be effected;
(2) "the members of the class are treated alike" under
similar circumstances and conditions; and

59. Id. at 652.
60. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 25-2-201 (2003) (emphasis added).
61. 312 S.C. 520, 435 S.E.2d 870 (1993).
62. Id. at 521-22,435 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420,424, 354 S.E.2d 36,
39 (1987)).
63. 295 S.C. 359, 368 S.E.2d 665 (1988).
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(3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis."
The court in Hickle applied the three-prong test to hold that the South Carolina
homestead exemption statute, which limits the exemption forpersonal injury awards
to South Carolina residents only, does not deprive nonresidents of equal protection
of the law.65 The court found the statute satisfied the test because "(1) it is
reasonably related to the legislative purpose of protecting South Carolina residents
from financial indigency; (2) the members of the classes are treated alike since all
residents are entitled to the exemption; and, (3) the classification is reasonably
based upon South Carolina's legitimate interest in preventing its citizens from
'
becoming dependent upon the [s]tate for support.""
Section 36-2-803(2) fails to satisfy any of the three prongs of the test
established by the state supreme court in Samson. First, to determine if section 362-803(2) creates a classification that bears a reasonable relation to the legislative
purpose sought to be effected, it is necessary to determine the purpose of the
provision. The intent of the long-arm statute, generally, is to extend the personal
67
jurisdiction of South Carolina's courts to the constitutional limits of due process.
Where venue may be laid or how venue can be transferred bears no reasonable
relation to the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Limiting or restricting change of
venue does not further the state's interest in acquiring jurisdiction over a person to
the full extent of constitutional due process. Prohibiting a nonresident defendant
from changing venue for the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice does
not promote the state's interest in providing resident plaintiffs with jurisdiction over
nonresidents. Thus, classifying nonresidents and residents differently for venue
purposes within the long-arm statute is not reasonably related to the legislative
purpose of asserting personal jurisdiction.
However, South Carolina may have a legitimate purpose in resolving the
6
disparate interests of the parties as to the place of trial. While this is not the
normal function or purpose of a long-arm statute, perhaps South Carolina has
determined that a plaintiff s interest in suing in the county of his choice deserves
greater weight when he acquires personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
based on the defendant's limited contacts with the state. South Carolina "could thus
slight to
have decided that a nonresident defendant's interest in convenience is too
69
Such a
choice."
his
outweigh the plaintiffs interest in suing in the forum of
70
Clause.
purpose is constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protections
64. Hickle, 312 S.C. at 522, 435 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting Samson, 295 S.C. at 364, 368 S.E.2d at
667 (quoting Smith, 291 S.C. at 424, 354 S.E.2d at 39).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491, 502 (D.S.C.
1970).
68. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992).
69. Id. at 652.
70. See id.
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The real purpose of section 36-2-803(2), however, is likely to provide plaintiffs
the most advantageous venue for their suits. This purpose alone is not sufficient to
avoid the creation of an arbitrary and unreasonable discriminatory classification
under a jurisdiction statute.
Second, the members of the class are not treated alike under similar
circumstances and conditions. Section 36-2-803(2) prohibits transferring venue for
the convenience of witnesses and the ends ofjustice only whenjurisdiction is based
solely on the long-arm statute.7 When the General Assembly passed the long-arm
statute, it provided in a subsequent section entitled "Other bases of jurisdiction
unaffected" that the South Carolina state courts may continue to "exercise
jurisdiction on any other basis authorized by law."72 Therefore, if a nonresident
defendant is brought within the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to another statute
or common law rule, then the section 36-2-803(2) prohibition against transfer of
venue should not apply. 73 For example, after the long-arm statute was passed, it was
not applied to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in Bouvy v. N. W. White &
Co." The Supreme Court of South Carolina in Bouvy acknowledged that "[t]he
right of a plaintiff to bring an action against a [nonresident] licensed motor carrier
in any county... is, of course, subject to the power of the court to change the place
of trial upon a showing that both the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of
justice will be furthered by the change. ' 75
,
This suggests that some nonresident
defendants, such as motor carriers, may move for a change of venue under section
15-7-100(3). Thus, the entire class of nonresident defendants is not treated the same
as required by the second prong of the Samson test. In this sense, section 36-2803(2) is underinclusive. If a plaintiff applies a method other than the long-arm
statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, then section 362-803(2) will not bar the defendant from changing venue for the convenience of
witnesses or the ends of justice.
Third, the classification in section 36-2-803(2) likely does not rest on a
reasonable basis. As mentioned in the above analysis of the first prong of the
Samson test, the only legitimate purpose section 36-2-803(2) could serve is to
resolve the disparate interests of the parties as to the place of trial. Therefore, what
reasonable basis exists for the classification in section 36-2-803(2) that relates to
resolving the disparate interests of the parties to the place of trial? Perhaps South
Carolina "decided that a nonresident defendant's interest in convenience is too
slight," when jurisdiction is based on the long-arm statute, "to outweigh the
plaintiff's interest in suing in the forum of his choice. 7 6 But section 36-2-803(2)

71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(2) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-805 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (emphasis added).
73. See discussion infra Part V.
74. 254 S.C. 164, 174 S.E.2d 347 (1970).

75. Id. at 166, 174 S.E.2d at 348.
76. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 652 (1992).
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prohibits South Carolina courts from analyzing on a case by case basis the degree
of inconvenience to a nonresident defendant of defending in the county of the
plaintiff's choice. Thus, South Carolina must have impliedly decided that when a
defendant is brought within the court's jurisdiction based on the long-arm statute,
his interest in convenience is always too slight to outweigh the plaintiff's interest
in suing in the forum of his choice. This notion demonstrates both the
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of section 36-2-803(2). No matter who
the defendant is, where he resides, or what his contacts with South Carolina may be,
if a plaintiff asserts personal jurisdiction over him based on the long-arm statute, he
loses the privilege of transferring venue. Also, nonresident defendants brought
within the personal jurisdiction of South Carolina courts by some means other than
the long-arm statute do not lose the privilege to transfer venue. Thus, the
classification in section 36-2-803(2) probably does not rest on a rational basis.
An appellate court may determine, in a majority of cases in which the long-arm
statute is applied, that the defendant's interest in convenience is too slight to
outweigh the plaintiffs interest in suing in the forum of his choice and may
therefore uphold section 36-2-803(2) as rationally related to a legitimate purpose.
Nevertheless, the prohibition against change of venue found in section 36-2-803(2)
likely fails to satisfy the Samson test; therefore, an appellate court should hold that
it violates the Equal Protection Clause. The classification certainly appears to be
arbitrary and not based on a real and substantial difference having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the legislation-personal jurisdiction.
IV. SECTION

36-2-803(2)

VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States declares "[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States."77 The definitions of "privileges" and "immunities" within the
meaning of this clause have evolved over the nation's history. While the Court has
never attempted to formulate a comprehensive list of the rights protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice Washington, serving as a circuit justice
78
in Corfield v. Coryell, included in a partial list of "fundamental privileges"
protected by the clause "the right of a citizen of one state . . .to institute and

'
79
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of [another] state." However, the
United States Supreme Court later abandoned the "natural rights" theory that
8
underlays Corfield. In Paulv. Virginia," the Supreme Court explained the object
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was "to place the citizens of each State
upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages

77.
78.
79.
80.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.1.
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
Id. at 552.
75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168 (1868).
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resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned." 8' Thus, the Court
departed from a "rights of a national citizen" approach to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and adopted an "equality of rights under each state" approach.
The Court in Haguev. CommitteeforlndustrialOrganization"2 repeated the notion
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is meant to guarantee the citizens of any
other state the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of the state,
explaining that this clause "prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of
other States in favor of its own."8' 3 And in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission
ofMontana,84 the Supreme Court established the principle that "[o]nly with respect
to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a
single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally." 5
Still, the Court noted that the clause protects those privileges originally set forth by
Justice Washington. 6 Therefore, the right of a citizen of another state to institute
and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the several states remains protected
by the Supreme Court's modem interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.
The constitutional requirement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is
"satisfied if the non-resident is given access to the courts of the State upon
terms
which in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforcing of [his] rights." 7
However, a nonresident is not entitled to the same rights as a resident. The
adequacy and reasonableness of the terms under which nonresidents of a state are
given access to its courts are to be determined by the courts, and ultimately by the
United States Supreme Court.8 To determine whether a statute violates the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the court must decide whether there is "a
substantialreason for the difference in treatment" and whether "the discrimination
practiced against nonresidents bears a [close or] substantial relationship to the
State's objective."89 "In deciding whether the discrimination bears a close or
substantial relationship to the State's objective, the Court [will consider] the
availability of less restrictive means."9

States may proscribe different procedural regulations for residents and
nonresidents if required by the due administration ofjustice to meet and provide for
the circumstance of nonresidence. 9' This rule has been applied to such matters as

81. Id. at 180.
82. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
83. Id. at 511.

84. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 383.
Id. at 387.
Canadian N. Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 562 (1920).
Id.
Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985) (emphasis added).
Id.
See Canadian N. Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 561-62 (1920).
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limitations of actions92 and service of process. The United States Supreme Court,
94
in CanadianNorthern Railway Co. v. Eggen, upheld the constitutionality of a
Minnesota statute that prohibited a plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action

the
within the state if it was barred by the laws of the place where it arose unless
95

plaintiff was a citizen of the state and owned the action ever since96it accrued. On
the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Ownbey v. Morgan that under the
Constitution, a state is "at liberty, if not under a duty," to secure to creditors who are
over the property
citizens of other states the same protection by foreign attachment
97 Similarly, in Herzoff v.
citizens.
own
its
to
of nonresidents that is accorded
Hommel," the Supreme Court of Nebraska struck down a statute limiting
continuances granted to defendant nonresident automobile owners to ninety days

99
where residents were not limited in such a way. The Herzoffcourtheld this statute

did not afford nonresident defendants reasonable opportunity to defend the action
and was therefore discriminatory and unconstitutional."
The reasoning of the Nebraska court in Herzoff is persuasive and should be
adopted by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Section 36-2-803(2) violates the
Privileges and Immunities Clause because it denies nonresident defendants the same
opportunities as residents to defend themselves in court. An analysis of the purpose
of the South Carolina change of venue statute, section 15-7-100, and the method by
which a party can change venue pursuant to the statute demonstrates how section
36-2-803(2) denies nonresident defendants the same opportunity as resident
defendants. Therefore, section 36-2-803(2) denies nonresident defendants equal
access to the courts-a constitutional right protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
South Carolina Code section 15-7-100(3) provides that the court may change
venue "[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be
"[e]ither party
promoted by the change."'' Once venue is laid in a proper county,
2 The trial judge
section]."'
[this
under
may then make a motion to change venue
of
has "the sound discretion to change the place of trial if both the convenience
03
moving
The
change.
witnesses and the ends of justice would be served" by the

92. Id. at 563.
93. See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 625-26 (1935).
94. 252 U.S. 553 (1920).
95. Id. at 563.
96. 256 U.S. 94(1921).
97. Id. at 109-10 (citing Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 248 (1898)).
98. 233 N.W. 458 (Neb. 1930).
99. Id. at 460.
100. Id.
101. S.C. CODEANN. § 15-7-100(3) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
102. McKissick v. J.F. Cleckley & Co., 325 S.C. 327, 334, 479 S.E.2d 67, 70 (Ct. App. 1996).
Inc.,
103. Id. at 335, 479 S.E.2d at 71 (emphasis added) (citing Arledge v. Colonial Oil Indus.,
645,646
S.E.2d
138
35,38,
S.C.
245
Santoro,
v.
272 S.C. 88,94, 249 S.E.2d 740,742 (1978); Skinner
(1964)).
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party bears the burden of proof for these elements."° "Once the moving party [for
a change of venue] makes a prima facie showing [that the] venue change will serve
both the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice, the burden shifts to
the party resisting the motion to overcome at least one of these requirements."' 0'5
When deciding whether a change of venue would be more convenient for
witnesses, the Supreme Court of South Carolina explained, "'It is not a question of
how much their convenience would be promoted thereby, but whether it would be
so promoted."" '
While "distance alone is not determinative, [the court will
presume] it is more convenient to travel a lesser rather than a greater distance."'0 7
Once convenience of witnesses has been shown, this proof "can, depending on the
facts of the case, bear on the issue of promotion ofjustice."' 8 Indeed, "a showing
of convenience of witnesses constitutes a prima facie showing that the ends of
justice would be promoted by the change."'0 9 In determining whether changing

venue satisfies the ends of justice requirement, the court has more narrowly stated
that "the ends ofjustice are promoted by having the credibility of witnesses judged
by jurors of the vicinage, the county in which the witnesses reside." 0 Thus, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina recognizes the importance of placing venue in a
jurisdiction in or near the county in which the witnesses reside.
By denying the opportunity to change venue under section 15-7-100(3), section
36-2-803(2) effectively eliminates a nonresident defendant's right to have suits tried
in a county that is close to a majority of the witnesses in the case and to have the
credibility of the witnesses judged by jurors of the same vicinage. The
constitutional requirement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is therefore not
satisfied because nonresident defendants are not given access to the courts of the
state upon terms which are reasonable and adequate for enforcing their rights.
No substantial reason exists for the difference in treatment between residents
and nonresidents regarding change of venue. Further, the discrimination against
nonresidents does not bear a close or substantial relationship to the state's objective
in asserting personal jurisdiction to the full extent of constitutional due process.
Also, less restrictive means are available to ensure the state's long-arm statute
104. Id. at 335,479 S.E.2d at 71 (citing Brice v. State Co., 193 S.C. 137, 140, 7 S.E.2d 850, 851
(1940)).
105. Id. at 336, 479 S.E.2d at 71 (citing Mixson v. Agric. Helicopters, Inc., 260 S.C. 532, 535,
197 S.E.2d 663, 664 (1973)).
106. Id at 340, 479 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Reynolds v. Atd. Coast Line R. Co., 217 S.C. 16, 21,
59 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1950)) (emphasis added by the court).
107. Id. at 339,479 S.E.2d at 73 (citing Arledge v. Colonial Oil Indus., Inc., 272 S.C. 88,91,249
S.E.2d 740, 741 (1978) (explaining that "'ordinarily, the necessity to travel a greater distance would
sustain an inference of inconvenience.')).
108. McKissick v. J.F. Cleckley & Co., 325 S.C. 327, 335, 479 S.E.2d 67, 71 (Ct. App. 1996)
(citing Vamadoe v. Hicks, 264 S.C. 216, 219, 213 S.E.2d 736, 737-38 (1975)).
109. Id. at 335, 479 S.E.2d at 71 (citing Beard v. Billups Petroleum Co., 228 S.C. 481,483, 90
S.E.2d 685, 686 (1956)).
110. Id. at 335-36, 479 S.E.2d at 71 (citing Holden v. Beach, 228 S.C. 234, 239, 89 S.E.2d 433,
435 (1955)).
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reaches the limitations of constitutional due process. The provision prohibiting
change of venue in the long-arm statute is not needed to effectively extend the
personal jurisdiction of South Carolina courts to the full limitations ofconstitutional
due process. Likewise, the distinction between residents and nonresidents made in
section 36-2-803(2) is not fairly required by the due administration of justice to
meet and provide for the circumstance of nonresidence. Once a South Carolina
court successfully acquires personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, no
legitimate purpose for the administration of justice is met by confining the
defendant to defend the case in the county of the plaintiff's choice. Either party,
whether plaintiff or defendant, should have the right to transfer venue for the
convenience of witnesses and the ends ofjustice. Therefore, because section 36-2803(2) denies nonresident defendants equal access to the courts of South Carolina,
in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it is unconstitutional."'
V. POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS TO AVOID THE PROHIBMON
Nonresident defendants can possibly avoid the section 36-2-803(2) strict
prohibition against transferring venue for the convenience of witnesses and the ends
of justice by proving that the court acquired or could have acquired in personam
jurisdiction over them pursuant to another statute or by common law. Section 36-2803(2) specifically states that only "[w]henjurisdiction over a person is based solely
upon this section" '" will the-motion for change of venue for the convenience of
witnesses and the ends ofjustice be prohibited. Thus, a nonresident defendant need
only prove that personal jurisdiction was or could have been acquired over him
through some other means. The General Assembly, when passing the long-arm
statute, provided in a subsequent section entitled "Other bases of jurisdiction
unaffected" that the South Carolina state courts may continue to "exercise
' 3
jurisdiction on any other basisauthorized by law." " Reading section 36-2-803 and
section 36-2-805 together allows South Carolina courts to acquire personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants pursuant to the long-arm statute or by any
other means previously available to the court. If the court uses other means to gain
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, then the defendant maintains
the right to transfer venue for the convenience of witnesses and the ends ofjustice.
A.

Jurisdictionby Consent

Likely, the most effective way for a nonresident defendant to convince the court

11I. One should note, however, that the Privileges and Immunities argument to invalidate section
36-2-803(2) will only benefit individuals. A corporation is not considered a "citizen" within the
meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and therefore receives no constitutional protections
from the clause. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (I Wall.) 168, 178 (1868).
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(2) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (emphasis added).
113. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-805 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (emphasis added).
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that it acquired in personam jurisdiction over him not solely based on the long-arm
statute is to argue that he consented to the court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
of South Carolina has stated that "[i]t has long been the law of the state of South
Carolina that lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived even by consent
but lack of jurisdiction of the person may be waived."'1 4 The court has repeatedly
held that a defendant may confer jurisdiction over his person by consent." 5
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is in accord with the common
law of South Carolina, declaring that "[a] state has power to exercise [personal]
jurisdiction" over nonresident individuals and corporations which "consent[] to the
exercise of such jurisdiction..... 6 This consent "may take the form of a confession
note, or of the waiver of service of process or of... acceptance of process outside
the state of the forum."' 7 Nonresidents are also subject to the jurisdiction of a court
by making a general appearance in an action. 8 Unless a nonresident defendant
appears specially to contest jurisdiction, he consents to the court's jurisdiction,
giving the court in personamjurisdiction over the defendant by both the long-ann
statute and consent. This ultimately requires a nonresident defendant to balance the
benefits of contesting or consenting to jurisdiction. The defendant must decide to
consent to the jurisdiction of the South Carolina courts and retain the statutory
privilege to change venue or to contest jurisdiction and subsequently lose the
privilege to change venue. This is not a beneficial trade-off.
A nonresident defendant, individual or corporation, may also give consent by
designating an agent or public official upon whom service may be made." 9 South
Carolina, by statute, can require a nonresident to appoint an agent or a public
official to accept service of process in certain cases. 2 ° If a nonresident does appoint
such an agent, the nonresident is subject to inpersonamjurisdiction in the state as
to all causes of actions to which the authority of the agent or official to accept
service extends. 2' Such is the case when a foreign corporation must appoint an
agent for service of process to receive authorization to do business in South
Carolina. When service of process is made upon a foreign corporation in
accordance with the method provided in section 15-9-240,12 such service is

114. Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Owens, 309 S.C. 73,75,419 S.E.2d 830,832 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Lillard v. Searson, 170 S.C. 304, 307, 170 S.E. 449, 451 (1933)).
115. See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 245 S.C. 83, 87, 138 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1964) (finding that a
defendant waived the jurisdictional objection by his failure to interpose it at the time of trial) (citing
City of Florence v. Berry, 61 S.C. 237, 240, 39 S.E. 389, 390 (1901)).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS
117. Id. §43 cmt. b.

§§

32,43 (1971).

118. Id. §§ 32 cmt. d, 33, 45.
119. Id. §§ 32 cmt. f, 35 cmt. b, 43 cmt. b, 44.
120. Id. §§ 32 cmt. f, 35 cmt. b, 43 cmt. b, 44 cmt. b.
121. Id. §§ 32 cmt. f, 35 cmt. b, 43 cmt. b, 44 cmt. a.
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-240 (West Supp. 2002) ("Service of process on authorized foreign
corporation.").
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123
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court in South Carolina.

Since the passage of the long-arm statute, section 15-9-240 has been rarely
applied to acquire personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. However,
before the passage of the long-arm statute, this section was frequently applied to
gain personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 124 Because section 36-2-805
declares that the long-arm statute does not affect other bases of jurisdiction, the
defendants can resurrect the applicability of section 15-9-240 to subject foreign
corporations to in personamjurisdiction and avoid the transfer of venue limitation
of section 36-2-803(2).
B. Jurisdiction by Implied Consent
A nonresident defendant may argue that the courts of this state acquired in
personam jurisdiction over him not solely based on the long-arm statute, but
through implied consent. By statute, a state can declare that a nonresident may
subject himself to the jurisdiction of the state's courts by doing acts in the state
which are dangerous to life or property, such as operating an automobile within the
jurisdiction of the state's courts
state. 2 ' The defendant thus subjects himself to2the
6
as to causes of action arising out of such acts.1
South Carolina's nonresident motorist statute does exactly this. Section 15-9350 provides that the operation of a motor vehicle by a nonresident on the public
roads of South Carolina "shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such
123. See Roorda v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 F. Supp. 868, 870 (D.S.C. 1979).
124. See, e.g., Shealyv. ChallengerMfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102, 107-08 (4thCir. 1962) (holding that
a Tennessee manufacturer had "sufficiently substantial and regular" activity in South Carolina to be
amenable to suit in the state and was subject to substituted service of process under the South Carolina

statute permitting such service upon foreign corporations transacting business in the state); Bramlett
v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (D.S.C. 1966) (holding that a Delaware corporation

maintained such control "over its franchise dealers as to constitute the 'minimum contacts' required
to validate plaintiffs' substituted service of process upon it through the Secretary of State of South
Carolina"); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D.S.C. 1965) (holding that a
manufacturer had sufficient control over its South Carolina distributor to satisfy the "minimum
contacts" standard and was therefore amenable to service in South Carolina), aft'd, 349 F.2d 60 (4th
Cir. 1965); Springs Cotton Mills v. Machinecraft, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 378, 372 (D.S.C. 1957) (holding

that a foreign corporation had "not maintained the necessary relations, contacts or ties with the State
of South Carolina to justify the State Court's jurisdiction over it which was sought to be perfected by
service upon the Secretary of State"); Ezell v. Rust Eng'g Co., 75 F. Supp. 980, 985 (D.S.C. 1948)

(holding that service of process on the process agent appointed by a Delaware corporation under the
South Carolina statute was effective to confer jurisdiction over the corporation); Boney v. Trans-State
Dredging Co., 237 S.C. 54,63-64, 115 S.E.2d 508,513 (1960) (holding Florida dredging corporation's
operations within South Carolina sufficient to render the corporation subject to thejurisdiction of South
Carolina courts and to substituted service ofprocess); State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 390-39,
38 S.E.2d 242, 247 (1946) (finding sufficient evidence that a foreign motors corporation was doing
business in South Carolina "to subject it to the jurisdiction of [the state's] courts, obtainable by service
of process through the Secretary of State").
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 36 cmt. c-d, 49 cmt. a (1971).

126. Id.
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nonresident of the Director of the Department of Public Safety ...
to be his true and
lawful attorney upon whom may be served all summons or other lawful process in
any action or proceeding against him" arising from his operation of the motor
vehicle within the state.' 27 When a nonresident individual or a corporation by its
agent makes use of the public highways of South Carolina, he accepts the
conditions of the statute and therefore "waive[s] the question of jurisdiction." '28
New York has also recognized that a "plaintiff in a South Carolina court may gain
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist by serving the South Carolina
Director of the Department of Public Safety as attorney for the nonresident
motorist.129
As noted above, section 36-2-805 declares that the long-arm statute does not
affect other bases ofjurisdiction. Therefore, nonresident defendants can resurrect
the applicability of section 15-9-350 to acquire in personam jurisdiction over
nonresident motorists and avoid the transfer of venue limitation of section 36-2803(2). This argument would help Bill Jones, the nonresident defendant in the
hypothetical above, to avoid the injustice of section 36-2-803(2) barring his transfer
of venue motion to the county where the accident occurred and all the witnesses
reside.
C. GeneralJurisdiction
While section 36-2-803 provides a method for acquiring specific jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code also
provides a method for acquiring general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 30
Section 36-2-802 provides that "[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, doing business, or maintaining
his or its principal place of business in, this State as to any cause of action." ' A
nonresident defendant can argue that section 36-2-802 applies to give the court
personal jurisdiction over him as to all causes of action, whether or not the suit
arises out of the defendant's activities within South Carolina. The court would then
have general jurisdiction over the defendant, the long-arm statute would not be the
sole basis of jurisdiction, and the nonresident defendant would still have the right
to transfer venue for the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice.
In Troy H. Cribb& Sons, Inc. v. Cliffstar Corp.,132 the Supreme Court of South
Carolina found that a foreign food-processing corporation was subject to general
jurisdiction when it shipped "in excess of25,000 cases of its foodstuffs to wholesale
and retail distributors" in South Carolina and when an in-state broker negotiated a

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-350 (West Supp. 2002).
Krueger v. Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708, 710 (D.S.C. 1943).
Morrison v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 657 N.Y.S.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-802 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
Id. (emphasis added).

132. 273 S.C. 623, 258 S.E.2d 108 (1979).
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substantial portion of this business.' The Troy court also found that the defendant
corporation was simultaneously amenable to inpersonamjurisdiction of the state's
courts under the long-arm statute. 34 Troy, therefore, supports the proposition that
a court may maintain more than one basis to acquire in personam jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant. This allows a nonresident defendant to prove he is
amenable to the court's jurisdiction through the general jurisdiction statute as well
as the long-arm statute and avoid the limitation on change of venue in section 36-2803(2).
However, it is unusual to make a defendant argue that the court should have
broader jurisdiction over the defendant than the plaintiff alleges in the complaint.
In most circumstances, the plaintiff is the party arguing that the court has general
jurisdiction over a defendant. It is equally unusual to imagine a plaintiff arguing
against the court acquiring general jurisdiction. Normally plaintiffs want to
establish, not reject, the right to sue a defendant for any cause of action, whether or
not it arises from the defendant's activities with the forum state. In this regard,
section 36-2-803(2) encourages the parties to a case to make jurisdictional
arguments that are normally against their best interest, in a general sense, in order
to attain favorable venue rules in the particular case at issue.
D. Jurisdictionby Statutory Service
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that personal jurisdiction is
authorized by section 15-9-750, 35 which provides for personal service outside the
state in cases where service by publication is permitted under section 15-9-7 10, if
36
the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state. Section 15-9-710
provides service may be made by publication in the following cases:
(1) [W]hen the defendant is a foreign corporation and has
property within the State or the cause of action arose therein;
(2) when the defendant, being a resident of this State, has
departed therefrom, with intent to defraud his creditors or to
avoid the service of a summons or keeps himself concealed
therein with like intent;
(3) when the defendant is a resident of this State and after a
diligent search cannot be found;
(4) when the defendant is not a resident of this State but has
property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject
of the action;
(5) when the subject of the action is real or personal property in
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 625, 258 S.E.2d at 109.
Id.
S.C. CODEANN. § 15-9-750 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
See Hendrix v. Hendrix, 296 S.C. 200, 202-03, 371 S.E.2d 528, 529-30 (1988).
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this State and the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent, therein or the relief demanded consists
wholly or partly in excluding the defendant from any interest
or lien therein;
(6) when the defendant is a party to an adoption proceeding and
is either a nonresident or a person upon whom service cannot
be had within the State after due diligence;
(7) when the defendant is a party to a proceeding for the
determination of parental rights and is either a nonresident or
a person upon whom service cannot be had within the State
after due diligence; and
(8) when the defendant is a party to an annulment proceeding or
where the subject of the matter involves the custody of minor
children, support of minor children or wife, separate
37
maintenance, or a legal separation.1
According to the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Hendrix v. Hendrix,138
if a nonresident defendant is personally served outside the state in one of the cases
listed above, then sections 15-7-90 and 15-7-710 apply to give South Carolina
courts personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' 39 Although this is admittedly
creative lawyering, if the nonresident defendant can satisfy these requirements, he
may be able to convince the court that the long-arm statute was not the only means
by which the plaintiff could have asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant
and thus avoid the long-arm statute's prohibition against changing venue for
convenience and justice.
E. Jurisdictionby In-State Service ofProcess
Historically, the authority of the court to acquire in personamjurisdiction over
a defendant required service of process within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. 14" The United States Supreme Court has held that a court may still exercise
personal jurisdiction based on service on the defendant while present in the state. 4 '
Justice Scalia stated "that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes
due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that
define the due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
42
justice."1
Arguing personal jurisdiction by in-state service of process, however, is not

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-710 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002).
296 S.C. 200, 371 S.E.2d 528 (1988).
Id. at 202-03, 371 S.E.2d at 529-30.
See supraPart II.A.
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
Id.
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likely to help most nonresident defendants, because most are served outside the
state. Nonetheless, if the defendant is served while within the state of South
Carolina, he can argue that this type of service granted personal jurisdiction over
him and no other basis for asserting personal jurisdiction was necessary. The longarm statute would therefore not be the sole basis ofjurisdiction when such service
is made and section 36-2-803(2) would not apply.
VI. CONCLUSION

Until stricken as unconstitutional, section 36-2-803(2) forces nonresident
defendants to argue that South Carolina courts can exercise inpersonamjurisdiction
through a basis other than the long-arm statute. A nonresident defendant has the
burden of proof to show that the court has jurisdiction over him through some other
means if he wants to avoid the long-arm statute's prohibition against change of
venue for the convenience of witnesses and ends ofjustice. Therefore, section 362-803(2) has arguably overruled common law rules regarding who carries the
burden of proving the court's jurisdiction.
South Carolina likely does not intend for nonresident defendants to resurrect
past methods of asserting personal jurisdiction. This would inhibit the purpose of
the long-arm statute. The long-arm statute combines past theories of specific
jurisdiction into a single statute and extends the jurisdiction of the state's courts to
the constitutional limits of due process. However, the courts may have to reconsider
these old theories in dealing with section 2 of the long-arm statute. Thus, the
purpose of the long-arm statute is significantly inhibited if the court is compelled
to determine on a case by case basis whether personal jurisdiction can be based on
some other theory.
This jurisdictional dilemma will continue until an appellate court rules on the
constitutionality of the provision in section 36-2-803(2) which prohibits a
nonresident defendant from changing venue for the convenience of witnesses and
the ends ofjustice. A court should hold that section 36-2-803(2) violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because it is arbitrary and not
based on a real and substantial difference having a reasonable relation to the subject
of the long-arm statute. A court should also hold that this provision violates the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution because nonresident defendants are not given equal access to the
courts of South Carolina on terms adequate to defend their rights. Until a court
addresses the constitutionality of § 36-2-803(2) and strikes the clause prohibiting
change of venue, this Comment provides some alternative arguments to avoid the
harshness of section 36-2-803(2).
Timothy Clardy
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